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Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus' remarks to Senate Foreign Relations Committee |
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Tuesday, 11 September 2007 |
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Amb. Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus' opening remarks to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Sept. 11
 View Opening Remarks
Related stories:
Petraeus, Crocker wrap-up testimony
Petraeus cites examples of reconciliation
Surge has reduced violence
Reductions could begin by summer 2008
SUBJECT: IRAQ, THE CROCKER-PETRAEUS REPORT CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE) WITNESSES: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ; RYAN CROCKER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ SEPTEMBER 11, 2007 Ambassador Crocker’s Opening Remarks I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis nor the complexity of the situation. Yet at the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems confronting them today. In my view, a secure, stable, democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors is attainable. In my judgment, the cumulative trajectory of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not deep. The process will not be quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment. There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory; any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect. This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening one. Iraq is experiencing a revolution, not just regime change. It is only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in Iraq and what Iraqis have achieved as well as maintain a sense of realism about the challenges that remain. Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the context of where they have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years of age -- and that is the overwhelming majority of the population -- would have known nothing but the rule of the Ba'ath Party before liberation four and a half years ago. Those 35 years were filled with crimes against humanity on every scale. Saddam Hussein ruled without mercy, not hesitating to use lethal force and torture against even those in his inner circle. His genocidal campaign against the Kurds and savagery towards southern Shi'a are well-known, but he also used violence and intimidation as tools in the complete deconstruction of Iraqi society. No organization or institution survived that was not linked in some way to regime protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even family members were afraid to talk to one another. This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when Saddam's statue came down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela existed to emerge on the national political scene; anyone with his leadership talents would not have survived. A new Iraq had to be built almost literally from scratch, and the builders, in most cases, were themselves reduced to their most basic identity -- ethnic or sectarian. Much progress has been made, particularly in building an institutional framework where there was none before. But rather than be in a period in which old animosities and suspicions were overcome, the past 18 months in particular have further strained Iraqi society. The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 had its seeds in Saddam's social deconstruction, and it had dire consequences for the people of Iraq as well as its politics. Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian killings by al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is and will remain for some time a traumatized society. It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraqi national politics must be seen. Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq, but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each other. The constitution approved in a 2005 referendum answered some of these questions in theory, but much remains uncertain in both law and practice. Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding debate about federalism among Iraq's leaders and most importantly perhaps within the Sunni community. Those living in places like Anbar and Salahuddin are beginning to realize how localities having more of a say in daily decision-making will empower their communities. No longer is an all- powerful Baghdad seen as the panacea to Iraq's problems. We are also seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first constructing a national framework but by tackling immediate problems. One such example is how the central government has accepted over 1,700 young men from the Abu Ghraib area west of Baghdad, including former members of insurgent groups, to be part of the Iraqi security forces. Another is how the government, without much public fanfare, has contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi army, offering them retirement, return to the military or public sector employment. So without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we see amnesty being granted on the ground, and we are seeing de-Ba'athification reform in the case of military officers with Ba'ath Party linkages, in advance of national legislation. In both instances, the seeds of reconciliation are being planted. In some respects, the debates in Iraq on issues such as de- Ba'athification and provincial powers are akin to those that surrounded our civil rights movement and our own debate on states' rights. With de-Ba'athification, Iraqis are struggling to come to terms with a vicious past. They are trying to balance fear that the Ba'ath party would one day return to power with the recognition that many former members of the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization not to repress others but for personal survival. With provincial powers, Iraqis are grappling with very serious questions about the right balance between the center and the periphery in Iraq. Many -- mainly Shi'a and Kurds -- see the devolution of power to regions and provinces as being the best insurance against the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others -- mainly Sunnis -- see Iraq, with its complex demographics, as in need of strong central authority. I do believe that Iraq's leaders have the will to tackle the country's pressing problems, although it will take longer than we originally anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the issues before them. An important part of my judgment in this regard was the effort made by Iraqi leaders this past summer. After weeks of preparatory work and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq's five most prominent national leaders from the three main communities issued a communiquéon August 26th that noted agreement on draft legislation dealing with de-Ba'athification and provincial powers. This agreement by no means solves all of Iraq's problems, but the commitment of its leaders to work together on hard issues is encouraging. Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders together decided to publicly express their joint desire to develop a long-term relationship with the United States. At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in the north and west of Iraq, where the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. These have opened the door for meaningful politics. In Anbar, as we know, security progress has been extraordinary. Al Qaeda overplayed its hand. Recognizing that the coalition could help eject al Qaeda, the tribes began to fight with us, not against us, and the landscape in Anbar is dramatically different as a result. Tribal representatives are now on the provincial council, which is meeting regularly to find ways of restoring services, developing the economy, and executing a development budget. Shi'a extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks by the Iranian-backed Jaish al- Mahdi on worshipers in the holy city of Karbala have provoked a backlash amongst moderate Shi'a and triggered a call by Muqtada al- Sadr for Jaish al-Mahdi to cease attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces. One of the key challenges for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to generate funds through taxation, making them dependent on the central government for resources. The growing ability of provinces to design and execute budgets and the readiness of the central government to resource them are success stories. Mr. Chairman, you and I saw one element of that on September 6 when representatives of Iraq's senior federal leadership traveled to Anbar and announced a 70 percent increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million from the central budget to compensate Anbaris for losses suffered in the fight against al Qaeda. In the economy, Iraq is starting to make some gains. The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed 6 percent for 2007. Budget execution has improved substantially. The latest data shows that ministries and provincial councils have committed these funds at more than twice the rate of last year, and much of the success, the high performers in the budget picture are in the provinces. So while there are signs of improvement, it is also true that the Iraqi economy is performing significantly under potential. Insecurity in the countryside raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and agriculture. Electricity supply has improved in many parts of the country, but is still woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighbors in the city receive two hours a day or less from the national grid, although power supplies for essential services such as water, pumping stations or hospitals are much better. At the regional and international level, there is expanding engagement with Iraq. In August, the U.N. Security Council at Iraq's invitation provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, UNAMI, with an expanded mandate through UNSCR 1770. The work of the International Compact with Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by Iraq and the United Nations. 74 countries pledged support for Iraq's economic reform efforts at a ministerial conference in May. The U.N. has reported progress in 75 percent of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this month, the Iraqi prime minister and the U.N. secretary-general will chair a ministerial-level meeting in New York to discuss further progress under the compact and how UNSCR 1770 can be most effectively implemented. Many of Iraq's neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the outcome of the current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. A neighbors ministerial in May, also attended by the P-5 and the G-8, has been followed by meetings of working groups on border security, refugees and energy. An ambassadorial-level meeting just took place in Baghdad, and another neighbors ministerial will be held in Istanbul at the end of October, as Senator Lugar notes. And it is also worth noting that at that ambassadorial meeting just two days ago, one of the items under discussion was the establishment of a permanent standing secretariat for the neighbors, to allow precisely the kind of continuity that I think you were referring to, sir. Iraq is now exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as well as through the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclusion on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with critically needed diesel. Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders’ communiqué and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. And Saudi Arabia is planning on opening an embassy in Baghdad – its first since the fall of Saddam. Syria's role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria hosts over a million Iraqi refugees and hosted the border security working group meeting last month. Syria has also interdicted some foreign terrorists seeking to transit to Iraq. On the other hand, suicide bombers continue to cross the border from Syria to murder Iraqi civilians. Iran has actively undermined Iraqi stability by providing funding, training and munitions to extremist militias that attack Iraqis as well as coalition forces. Whether Iraq reaches its potential is, of course, ultimately the product of Iraqi actions. But the changes in our strategy last January, the surge, have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better. The involvement and support of the United States will continue to be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome. Our country has given a great deal in blood and treasure to stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for a united, democratic country governed under the rule of law. They have not yet realized this vision, and to do so will take more time and patience on the part of the United States. I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. The challenges, as I have stated, are immense. I do believe, as I have described, that success is attainable. I am certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood. An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering well beyond what has already occurred within Iraq's borders. It could well invite the intervention of regional states, all of which see their future connected to Iraq's in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in such a scenario, consolidating its influence over Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The Iranian president has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In such an environment, the gains made against al Qaeda and other extremist groups could easily evaporate and they could establish strongholds to be used as safe havens for regional and international operations. Our current course is hard. The alternatives are far worse. Every strategy requires constant recalibration. This is particularly true in an environment like Iraq, where change is a daily occurrence. As chief of mission in Iraq, I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of our military. I believe that thanks to the support of Congress, we have an appropriate civilian posture in Iraq. Over the coming year, we will continue to increase our civilian efforts outside of Baghdad and the international zone. In the course of 2007, we have increased the number of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for example, from 10 to 25. This presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building, especially in the provinces, and the provinces are likely to grow in influence as more power devolves from Baghdad. We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front may come in many forms and must ultimately be done by Iraqis themselves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gen. Petraeus’ Opening Remarks Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way forward. As I stated in testimony to the two House committees yesterday, this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this myself and did not clear it with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House or Congress. Today, I will provide a summary of the full written testimony I have provided to each of you and for the record. As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are in large measure being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq, for example, has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks. During this time, ethno-sectarian violence has also been reduced and the number of overall civilian deaths has declined, though both are clearly still at troubling levels. The progress is a result of many factors. Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda-Iraq and have disrupted Shi'a militia extremists. Additionally in a very significant development, we and our Iraqi partners are being assisted by tribes and local citizens who are rejecting extremism and choosing to help secure Iraq. Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer -- withdrawing one quarter of our combat brigades by that time without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible for us to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. Having provided that summary, I would like to review briefly the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place. The question is whether it is resolved more or less violently. This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq, and you have charts in front of you as well. Foreign and homegrown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals al push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and especially by Iran fuel that violence and lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and various forms of corruption add to the challenges. In January 2007, in response to the horrific ethno-sectarian violence that spiraled out of control in 2006, and to an assessment in December of 2006 that we were failing to achieve our objectives, a surge of forces began flowing into Iraq, focusing on protecting the population and reducing sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. In so doing, these forces have employed counterinsurgency practices, such as living among the people they are securing. In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive operations in partnership with Iraqi security forces. These operations focused on expanding the gains it achieved in the preceding months in Anbar province, pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas and clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province and important areas around Baghdad. And with coalition and Iraqi forces located among the populations they are securing, we have sought to keep areas clear and to help Iraqis in rebuilding them. All the while, we have engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, leading to additional elements standing up to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists. The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders see improvements in the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations; to gauge progress and determine trends, we also conduct rigorous, consistent data collection and analysis. In fact, two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq. As I mentioned up front and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in eight of the past 12 weeks with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006. Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December -- this is shown by the top line on this next chart -- and the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks, car bombings by al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is of serious concern. As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, ethno-sectarian deaths have come down by over 55 percent. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, ethno-sectarian deaths have declined by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence and identifies the areas where more work must be done. As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found substantially increased numbers of arms, ammunition and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, we have so far this year already found and cleared over 4,400 aches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction of the overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months which, as this next chart shows, has declined sharply, by about one-third since June. The change in the security situation in Anbar province has of course been particularly dramatic. As this next chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi army and Iraqi police services. To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this next chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh province, for example, has been much more up and down until a recent decline. And the same has been true in Salahuddin province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad, as shown, have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq -- a steady decline of incidents in the past three months -- is still quite significant. The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past five months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this next chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this trend has been heartening, the number of high-profile attacks is clearly still too high. And we continue to work hard to destroy the networks, with our Iraqi counterparts, that carry out these barbaric attacks. Our operations have produced substantial progress against al Qaeda in Iraq. As this next chart shows, in the past eight months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized five important media cells, detained a senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda-Iraq and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda-Iraq is certainly not defeated. However it is off balance, and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by conventional forces, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and special operations elements. The combination of these assets is necessary to conduct effective operations against terrorist elements. In the past six months, we have also targeted Shi'a militia extremists, killing or capturing over 1,400 rank-and-file and senior leaders. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting al Qaeda and other extremists. The success in Anbar is an example of what can happen when local Iraqis decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology and indiscriminate violence. While Anbar's model cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local citizens. As this next chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. Over 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi National -- the Iraqi Police Service. Thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq security forces. As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country. As this next chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi army, national police and special operations forces battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations as judged by the operational readiness assessments, albeit with some coalition support. Although their qualitative development has not always kept pace with their quantitative growth, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers and equipment. Despite the losses, a number of Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. In order to take over the security of their country, the Iraqis are rapidly expanding their security forces. In fact, they now have some 445,000 assigned to the Ministries of Interior and Defense forces, and we believe they will be closed to 480,000 by year's end. Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales customers, committing some 1.6 billion (dollars) to FMS already, with the possibility of up to 1.8 billion (dollars) more being committed before the end of this year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: "Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch." This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have achieved in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important medium to spread extremism. The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum; Iraqi security forces have slowly been shouldering more of the security burden; a mission focused on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives; success against al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces, as well as special operations forces; and the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces. My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations: political progress will only take place if sufficient security exists; long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course; regional, global and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council Resolution, and following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States and other nations. Based on these considerations and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, this will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four additional combat teams and two Marine battalions in the first seven months of 2008 until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008. In my professional judgment, however, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will no later than that time consider factors similar to those on which I base the current recommendations, having by then of course a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts and the enemy's situation. This final chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq. In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions, and though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence, and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals, and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists, and as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and very likely the most professional force in our nation's history. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they have needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families as they too have made significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment, in munitions, in command, control and communications systems, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives. In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America's new "greatest generation." Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much. |
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