PRESS CONFERENCE:

Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Director of Communications, Deputy Spokesman, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

Colonel David W. Sutherland, Commander of the Grey Wolf Brigade, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division

DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 2007

TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL, LTD.

LEILA FADEL FROM MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS

REPORTERS 1-9

*REP1 = REPORTER 1

*INT = INTERPRETER

RDML SMITH: Good afternoon. As-Salāmu `Alaykum.  I’m joined today by a great American, Colonel David Sutherland, the Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, known as the Grey Wolves.  They will complete their 15-month tour this coming week and redeploy back to their home garrison in Fort Hood, Texas.  The Grey Wolf Brigade operated primarily in the Diyala province, and will be the first of five brigades to depart Iraq without replacements over the next several months.  I will provide a brief operation update and then also discuss Multi-National Force – Iraq’s plans to continue support of operations during this drawdown period.  And I’ll turn the remainder of team to Colonel Sutherland.  Let me begin by outlining Iraqi and collation forces’ operations targeting al-Qaida networks here in Iraq and the leadership that we've taken down over just the last seven days.  Based on intelligence-driven operations, security forces captured five foreign terrorist facilitators and killed six others in the areas around Baqubah and Baghdad.  Interdicting these networks continues to undermine al-Qaida’s ability to infiltrate foreign terrorists responsible for 90% of the suicide bombing attacks here in Iraq.  In the vicinity of Samarra, 17 al-Qaida terrorists involved in media cells and propaganda networks were killed and one was captured.  The media cells or propaganda networks, many of which we briefed you on previously as having been interdicted, are vital to AQI’s efforts to recruit and raise funds.  On Sunday, coalition forces captured the senior al-Qaida leader for Beji.  In addition to running al-Qaida’s operations in the Beji area, he was also a key facilitator of foreign terrorists in northern Iraq.  On Monday in Baghdad, a leader of the al-Qaida in Iraq car bomb network was killed.  On the same day in Mosul, a senior al-Qaida in Iraq leader who organized suicide car bombs and purchased explosives for the network was also killed.  We also continue to find torture houses and execution sites in areas where al-Qaida has been operating.  On Monday, coalition forces found a makeshift prison in Samarra that contained the bodies of two men found in shackles, who appear to have been killed as coalition forces arrived on scene.  On Tuesday, two terrorists involved in finance and communication networks were captured near Samarra.  Also on Tuesday, a top al-Qaida planner and Mosul’s car bombing network leader was captured.  On the same day, a coalition force air strike killed two al-Qaida in Iraq leaders from Arab Jabour.  These two terrorists were responsible for numerous attacks on al-Qaida and coalition forces, and maintain large stockpiles of munitions, weapons, and other bomb-making materials.  On Thursday, coalition forces captured an al-Qaida leader who was in charge of a foreign terrorist logistics and operations cell in the Arab Jabour area.  While Iraqi and coalition forces continue to make sustained progress against these terrorists, al-Qaida and other militia extremist groups remain a dangerous enemy of Iraq.  Yesterday in Mosul, al-Qaida in Iraq conducted two suicide attacks against Iraqi police, the first against a checkpoint and the second against first responders.  Then south of Mosul, al-Qaida detonated a truck bomb on the Qarah bridge.  In these two attacks, al-Qaida murdered 21 Iraqis, to include ten innocent civilians, and injuring 25 more.  These barbaric attacks are not deterring Iraqis.  They continue to reject al-Qaida's sinister, Taliban-like ideology.  Despite the intimidation and suffering brought by the horrific consequences of suicide car bomb attacks, murder and torture, Iraqis are increasingly supportive of a peaceful political transition inside Iraq.  This helps explain why more than 77,000 Iraqi civilians have now volunteered to protect their villages from extremism by being part of a concerned local citizen effort.  AQI is not the only enemy of Iraq whose goals are to destabilize and turn back the clock on the progress made by the Iraqi people.  Yesterday in central Baghdad, criminals infiltrated a pet market with a ball bearing-laden bomb disguised inside a birdcage carrying birds, which exploded, killing and injuring scores of innocent Iraqis.  In raids overnight, Iraqi and coalition security forces were able to identify and detain four members of a militia extremist group we assess as responsible for this horrific act of indiscriminate violence.  Based on subsequent confessions, forensics, and other intelligence, the bombing was the work of an Iranian-backed, special group cell operating here in Baghdad.  The group’s purpose was to make it appear al-Qaida had been responsible for this attack.  Despite killing innocent Shia and Sunni, the special group’s aim appears to have been to demonstrate to Baghdadis the need for militia groups to continue providing their security inside Baghdad.  Again, this bombing demonstrates there are individuals who continue to ignore Muqtada al-Sadr’s pledge of a ceasefire.  Iraqi and coalition forces will continue to capture or kill those who choose to dishonor Muqtada’s pledge by committing these acts of indiscriminate violence against innocent Iraqis.  It’s the dedication and hard work of Iraqi security forces, Iraqi citizens, and troops like those under Colonel Sutherland that are working to put an end to the tragic events witnessed yesterday in the Shora market.  Let me now transition to the departure of the Wolf Brigade.  During his September 2007 testimony to the United States Congress, General Petraeus assessed the current conditions will enable the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces to accept more control of the battlespace through a planned drawdown of American troops.  Current conditions allow for a withdrawal of the first unit, the Grey Wolf Brigade, starting on November 27th.  If conditions continue to permit, a total of five brigade combat teams will be redeployed over the next eight months.  There are several important points we want to express on the redeployment of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team.  The redeployment without replacement reflects overall improved security within Iraq, as well as the improved capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and the emergence of concerned local citizens.  The redeployment of the Grey Wolf Brigade does not mean their operations in Diyala province will be vacated.  In fact, we do not intend to give back our hard fought ground.  Repositioning of coalition and Iraqi security forces will ensure that overall force levels and combat capability levels in Diyala will be tailored to meet emerging threats.  AQI remains a threat in Diyala, and our forces, alongside the Iraqis, will continue to combat these terrorists.  The improved security situation in Iraq, brought about by the surge of operations, more capable Iraqi security forces, and the courageous commitment by Iraqi citizens to oppose al-Qaida and other extremist violence, has made the redeployment of the five combat brigades possible.  The Iraqi citizens and their elected government are forging a nation that represents all its citizens, and one that will be able to govern, defend, and sustain itself.  The redeployment of the Grey Wolf Brigade represents a positive step towards reaching this destination.  On behalf of the Multi-National Force - Iraq, I want to congratulate Colonel Sutherland and the entire Grey Wolf Brigade for their outstanding service and sacrifice, and for their significant contributions toward brightening the future of all Iraqis, a future of peace and security, prosperity and self-reliance, and a representative government that reflects all of its citizens.  Colonel Sutherland.

COL SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Sir.  Good afternoon. As-Salāmu `Alaykum.  I am Colonel David W. Sutherland, Commander of the Grey Wolf Brigade, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.  And my brigade has begun transitioning out of Diyala province.  And with the incoming 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, which has been conducting combat operations in other areas of Iraq for the past six months but is now absorbing Diyala as their battlespace.  Although our redeployment is part of the downgrade of the troops across Iraq, their presence allows more boots on the ground in the province.  Over the past 14 months, my soldiers and the Iraqi security forces, the provincial government, and other officials have worked hard to bring stability and services to Diyala.  And it’s truly gratifying to see the efforts of my soldiers come to fruition.  Diyala is a very different province now than when we assumed control in November of last year.  Late last year, our kinetic problem set was influenced by the Baathist resurgence, Kurdish expansion, Iranian influence in the province, Iraqi Shia domination, al-Qaida influence on the Sunni population, and attempts by other extremist groups to destabilize the province, gain control of the resources, and build their power base.  Our non-kinetic problem set was just as complex.  It included a dysfunctional government that lacked experience, was afraid to come to work, and a lack of a local media to dispel rumors and provide transparency within the government and the security forces.  The rampant issues with corruption that were taking place, with leaders placing their ambitions and needs ahead of the needs of the constituency, the lack of essential services for food, water, electricity, and fuel, the perception of sectarian Iraqi security forces, and numerous tribal conflicts plagued the province and divided the population.  These were also adding to the complexities of this non-kinetic problem set.  Those kinetic and non-kinetic problems and influences created an environment of mistrust and disgust that swirled the province into a cycle of violence.  Public perception of inequity, corruption, and fear became the driving force behind support to terrorists, specifically al-Qaida.  Multiple political groups as well as tribes were turning to different organizations for protection because of unwarranted hysterics.  Uniting in order to combat sectarian-motivated attacks, Diyala’s immature media environment was improving.  However it did not stop this unwarranted hysterics created by the terrorist attacks, nor did it create transparency in the government and the Iraqi security forces.  Just to put it in perspective, in May prior to Operation Arrowhead Ripper and the surge of troops in Diyala, there were 1,051 significant acts of violence, which included acts such as murders, kidnappings, and suicide attacks.  Today, the operational environment is drastically improving.  By the end of October, there were 464 significant acts of violence reported.  This is a drop of over 50% of significant acts in a province the size of Maryland, with over 1.6 million citizens.  By November 20th, there were a little over 200 violent acts in the month.  And we are on track to drop violent acts by the end of the month significantly from October.  These improvements would not have been possible without the support and cooperation from the local citizens who were tired of the hatred and disgust offered by extremist organizations.  The surge enabled the coalition and Iraqi security forces to dominate the terrain and secure the population.  It also helped the government to function properly and begin focusing on reconstruction and essential services.  However, it was the courage of the local citizens that enabled the dramatic changes we see now.  As I’ve said on numerous occasions, we cannot kill our way out of this.  In Diyala, when the government loses its will, the people lose hope and they turn to other sources to provide that hope.  Today there is hope in Diyala.  We now have approximately 3,000 concerned local citizens who have stood up against al-Qaida.  They assist the Iraqi police by guarding their own roads and local infrastructure, and manning checkpoints throughout the province.  They also provide coalition and the Iraqi security forces with actionable information about weapons caches, locations of house-borne IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, deep buried IEDs, and are even pointing out known al-Qaida fighters.  These concerned local citizens understand that the future of Iraq can be better if they get involved in ridding the province of al-Qaida and participate in the development of their own democracy.  Approximately 700 concerned local citizens have joined the ranks of the Iraqi police, and the provincial director of police has submitted over 3,000 names to MOI, the majority of whom are from the ranks of CLCs across Diyala.  Citizens and leaders are getting involved in participating in the development of their democracy.  Tribes are reconciling their differences and standing up to fight extremists and return Diyala to prosperity.  However, unlike al-Anbar and other provinces, reconciliation in Diyala has been very complex due to the mixture of 25 major tribes with over 100 sub-tribes consisting of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, all competing for resources and position.  Regardless of the complexity of it, reconciliation in Diyala is helping eliminate the rifts in the society that al-Qaida attempted to exploit.  It has not been easy, however.  The provincial government has active reconciliation initiatives, with more than 300 tribal leaders representing 19 major tribes signing the agreement.  As a result of these reconciliation agreements, we’ve seen a drop in significant violent acts of over 68% throughout Diyala since the month of April.  The local government is also improving.  It has allocated over $114 million from the 2006 budget and over $106 million from the 2007 budget for reconstruction projects.  These projects include water treatment facilities, electricity, fuel, and other essential services needed.  As of today, we have awarded over 80% of their 2006 budget, which is a huge step forward from last year, where only 2% of the reconstruction budget was awarded.  Bids for the 2007 budget have been open, and we expect contracts to be awarded by mid-December.  The public distribution system, which is an Iraqi-subsidized food program, is functional in all five qaddahs in the province.  This is a system that had not been functioning for a year and a half prior to our arrival.  Local government and security forces are providing humanitarian assistance to the most remote areas where PDS might not yet have the ability to reach the population.  Local businesses are beginning to open and jobs are now becoming available.  We currently have five flour mills operating in Baqubah and producing flour that is available throughout the province.  Rice is also being produced locally and is now available to the citizens.  Work programs to clean the city of Baqubah are underway, and employ more than 1,000 people.  Approximately 2,000 men have taken jobs as security guards for critical infrastructure.  These men guard everything from fuel stations to PDS warehouses to irrigation canals.  The canal systems, which are so important in Diyala because of the agriculture base, are now being cleaned and fixed to help water reach farming areas throughout the province.  Orange and dates, the most important exports from Diyala, are now reaching the markets and improving the local economy.  This year’s date harvest was 50% greater than last year’s.  I cannot complete this brief without highlighting the achievements of my soldiers and the Iraqi security force counterparts during this deployment.  They are the driving force behind the changes throughout the province and our greatest asset.  So far my soldiers, in partnership with the Iraqi security forces, have conducted 20 brigade-level operations, over 250 battalion-level operations, over 30,000 combat patrols, detained over 1,100 suspected terrorists and cleared over 2,2000 improvised explosive devices.  Our soldiers’ determination to see the mission accomplished is nothing short of outstanding.  They have constantly shown our host nation and the Iraqi security forces how a professional Service performs its duty.  Now our soldiers are looking forward to returning home to their families and friends, knowing that the people of Diyala will have a chance for a better future for them and their children.  Thank you for your time, and I’ll answer questions that you might have.

SIMMONS:   Ann Simmons of the Los Angeles Times.  Colonel, is there any concern at all that when you do redeploy that the insurgents may just rise again, and there might be a problem?  Or are the concerned citizens equipped enough to deal with anything that might occur in the future?

COL SUTHERLAND: The people will determine that, and right now the people have hope Diyala.  There is concern, but when you talk about the concerned local citizens, we’ve detained 60 concerned local citizens that were turned in by either other CLCs or by other populations that were not following the rules or acting up.  So there is a checks and balances system in place that makes a difference for this. 

RDML SMITH: I think also the Colonel mentioned while his forces are redeploying there are other forces moving into Diyala region.  In fact, I think you can point out the numbers.  The capability will actually increase in terms of the number of soldiers on the ground in Diyala in the coming weeks and months.

COL SUTHERLAND: When we first arrived in Diyala I was able to put out bout 700-800 soldiers on a given day.  The Stryker Brigade brings much more capability in the way of boots on the ground to the point of about 3,000 soldiers on the ground in a given day. 

NORDLAND: Rod Nordland from Newsweek.  So do I understand that this a net decrease in surge troops in the theater overall?

RDML SMITH: That’s correct.  And we’re describing Iraqi-wide brigade combat team reduction in Diyala, as you just pointed out, an actual increase in total numbers of soldiers on the ground in Diyala.  Not to be confused.  Again, a net decrease across Iraq but actually an increase in Diyala.

NORDLAND: How many is that? 

RDML SMITH: Roughly, as we take out a brigade.  Colonel? 

COL SUTHERLAND: We’re talking about 5,000.

NORDLAND: You watch the numbers of the increase in Diyala?

RDML SMITH: I think he just pointed out.  Now what’s being left behind after the 1st pulls out is an increase is around 2,400 or so troops available to conduct operations to the commanders now on the ground in Diyala. 

GINA CHON: Gina Chon, Wall Street Journal.  Admiral Smith, I had a question for you regarding what you mentioned earlier regarding the overnight raid and the Iranian-backed militia cell.  What does that say, then, about recent developments of, you know, people saying that Iran seemed like it was actually trying to honor its pledge to stop either support or munitions from coming in, and will that affect any future meetings between the three parties?

RDML SMITH: Yeah, we’ve spoken at length about the historical presence of Iranian-backed militias here inside of Iraq.  And these special groups have been trained, equipped, financed, and sometimes even led by Iranian-backed groups.  And so, the key here is that there is a cell still operating inside of Iraq.  These are individuals that are not honoring Muqtada al-Sadr’s pledge of a ceasefire.  They are acting outside the law, and they’re being dealt with as criminals.  And we assess the attack yesterday was conducted by these militia extremist groups, again operating outside of Muqtada’s pledge.  And it’s unfortunate that in this incidence they conduct their activities inside a busy pet market and in effect killed scores of innocent civilians. 

CHON:           (Unintelligible)

BLAKELY:    Hi.  Two questions, first for the Colonel.  The 3,000 names that was…I’m sorry, Jonathan Blakely from National Public Radio.  Excuse me.  3,000 names volunteering for the Iraqi police.  Is that correct?  I just want to make sure I got the numbers correct.

COL SUTHERLAND: That’s correct.  The provincial director of police has collected 3,000 names of individuals that he’d like to hire for the police.  We’ve got an increase in authorization from MOI for the province of 6,000.  He’s got 3,000 right now that have volunteered, and he’s continuing to work for the remaining 3,000.

BLAKELY:    Okay.  We were hearing, and I don’t know if you could comment on this, that most of those names are Shia, not necessarily Sunni.  Can you comment on the breakdown?

COL SUTHERLAND: Actually it’s about 2-to-1 Sunni-Shia.

BLAKELY:    Really?

COL SUTHERLAND: Yessir.

BLAKELY:    Okay.  Also, for the Admiral.  From the pet market yesterday going all the way back to the Stryker.  Certainly there’s been a lull in violence in the region.  But would you say we’re in the midst of a spike?

RDML SMITH: Yeah, again statistically this would be hard to describe as a spike.  There are a number of attacks that occur on any given day have those trends started to come down as we’ve reported.  We’ve also said that we expect that there will be bad days to come in the future.  Again, this is still an enemy with a determined purpose.  And they are enemies of Iraq that are bent on nothing short of turning back the progress that’s taken place thus far.  We’ve still got an enemy out there that we’re going after.  If you talk to Colonel Sutherland, he’s got an enemy in his battlespace that still remains very capable of conducting attacks against both his forces and that of the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi people.  So we do not assess that we are in a trend of peace.  We have a decreasing trend of violence.  And yesterday’s attack is a good example of the kind of indiscriminate violence that the enemies of Iraq are willing to play against the people of Iraq.  And it’s unfortunate that so many Iraqis pay that price on a given day.

RUBIN:          Allison Rubin of the New York Times.  You said there’s an overall theater-wide reduction of about 5,000.  Can you give us some idea of where that’s coming from, whether its some people are going home, or units going home from different areas?  Because it’s a little bit unclear.  I don’t know if the troops of Diyala are going to be stationed entirely in Diyala, or whether they’re partly in Tikrit.  If you could clarify that.  And then also on the mortar attack the other day.  Was that also something that you think was possibly from an Iranian-backed cell, the mortar attack, or rocket attack on the Green Zone?

RDML SMITH: Let me answer the second question.  I’ll let the Colonel describe again the drawdown forces.  He can more precisely tell you about that.  The mortar attack the other day against a multiple number of coalition outposts, we do assess as having been conducted by rogue militia groups.  Precisely, the cells and networks associated with that are still being worked through from an intelligence point of view.  But that’s our assessment at this time. 

RUBIN:          (Unintelligible)

RDML SMITH: To coalition forces there were no deaths associated with that.  I don’t recall if any civilians were killed.  There were some injuries, but no deaths.  And on the redistribution of forces and the drawdown and where they came from inside Iraq, I’ll let Colonel Sutherland describe, as he’s participated in that.

COL SUTHERLAND: 4/2—4th Brigade, 2nd ID—has been here for six months operating in the southwestern portion of Diyala and southeastern portion of Salahuddin.  As my brigade began the withdrawal or redeployment, the three battalions that I had are being absorbed by five battalions from 4/2.  These are through repositioning from areas where the security situation, the Iraqi security forces have improved and been able to absorb that battle space more and more.  But 4/2 has been in Iraq for several months.  Some of the battalions that have been working for me based on the surge are staying and working for 4/2 since they are organic to that brigade.  So, as my now two battalions depart, there are still five battalions left inside the province that will be functioning inside there and providing security.  Also, some of my forces based on 1st Brigade 101st occupation of Salahuddin, some of my brigades have been working for them—or battalions rather—have been working for them, and as they withdraw, 1st Brigade 101st will absorb their battle space that they move out from on the eastern side of Salahuddin.  So, battlefield geometry, we go from three battalions inside Diyala in about the March timeframe…we went up because of the surge to five and they’ll remain at five based on incoming forces and repositioning.

RUBIN:          So where are the people who are leaving coming from in the theater?  Why (unintelligible)?

COL SUTHERLAND: From my brigade, for instance.  My brigade has been there, but based on repositioning of forces throughout the province, other battalions have reabsorbed my battlespace, so my brigade will depart in total.  And they’re already replaced.

RUBIN:          I see.  That’ll be the net five.

RDML SMITH: Yeah, again to just simplify the math here.  The surge was five brigades as you all recall.  A brigade nominally is between five and six thousand soldiers.  That’s the round of thirty thousand.  And that includes some enabling forces that exist as well to support those operations.  The drawdown will result in, as each brigade draws down, a roughly five thousand or so soldiers will come out of the battlespace, not to be replaced.  But the areas in which they operate in may well be taken up by existing forces in the theater.  That’s the essential way of understanding from a battle field geometry point of view. 

SMITH:          Sir, just a check with time…sorry, David Smith of the Observer in the UK.  Just to check the timetable on that, is this first brigade withdrawing literally, sort of today, or in the coming days?  And when will the next brigade leave?  And again, that presumably around five thousand troops.  On the second, completely separate question, going on to the point you were mentioning with regards to the pet market attack yesterday…do you, and does General Petraeus have any concerns that, particularly in the media perhaps, there is almost…the coverage is almost a bit too positive and might slightly exaggerate progress in Iraq and might slightly raise expectations too high and leave the entire operations riding for a fall?

RDML SMITH: Regarding the next brigade that will come out, we’ll announce those as they occur.  But essentially in 2008 will be the next iteration.  There will be a phase down between now and July of 2008.  And as to the actual date, it’s only a few days away in which literally he’ll take his flag down and move back to the States.  So I don’t know if you want, the date…

COL SUTHERLAND: We transfer authority on the 27th of this month.  But I have forces already redeploying.

RDML SMITH: Now to your last question, I think it’s important for the media to understand the full context of what’s occurring inside Iraq.  I know it’s very difficult for anyone, if you’re living and operating here Baghdad, you see a certain soda straw view of Baghdad.  If you’re in Diyala, you see in Diyala.  But the key is from our conversation with you, we’ve been trying to be very clear that we see a matrix, a different environment, and different levels of violence in various places inside Iraq.  We also have recognized that—and have an awareness of—the potential of the enemies’ ability to regenerate capability and to reconstitute some of its networks.  In the case of al-Qaida, that the ceasefire that Muqtada al-Sadr has pledged, and those that are honoring it are very significant, that the role of the Iraqi security forces and the concerned local citizens all play and mix into that calculus—the choices of how that gets reported clearly is yours to make.  Again, the cautions we’ve offered, I think are because we’re pragmatic, and taking an approach that has reserved our optimism based on what we know.  And I think it’s important for you to report as you see it.  There are good stories to tell here in terms of returning Iraqis.  There are economic development that’s occurring that needs to be reported, but I would do it in a measured pace.  We’ve been dealing what caution would offer.

SMITH:          And just quickly, can I check the…the Iranian-backed cell involved in the market bombing.  Does that have a particular name?

RDML SMITH: Let me make it clear when I say “Iranian-backed.”  Special groups have been historically backed by the Iranians, the Quds forces we’ve described before.  The training, the equipping that goes into the ability to conduct the kind of operation that was conducted yesterday, the making of the particular kind of bomb, the forensics that we know from that particular bomb and that explosion, has the fingerprints of a special group.  Therefore, again, having been facilitated through Iranian connections.  I’m not saying that yesterday Iran ordered the bombing of the pet market.  What I’m telling you is that the forces that are inside Iraq that had historically received training, funding, equipping, and so forth by the Iranians is the group responsible for that attack.

FADEL:          Leila Fadel from McClatchy Newspapers.  I came in a little bit late, so I might be slightly confused.  But can you tell me exactly what the fingerprints are that show you this is an Iranian-backed special group.  And then also for Diyala, the current…with the surge, once you leave, there are more boots on the ground than there are in the surge currently right now?

COL SUTHERLAND: In Diyala. In March, I was able to have about 750 combat troops outside the wire.  The surge enabled an increase, and it pretty much stayed the same and will remain the same as we reposition throughout the area, Salahuddin and Diyala.

RDML SMITH: But again, Iraq-wide, you’ll see a reduction of around five thousand.  And when this is all said, you’ll see a reduction at this point in time of around five thousand U.S. soldiers on the ground in Iraq.

FADEL:          Can I ask just if in your successes in Diyala, are you having more success against al-Qaida than you are against I guess what would be the Shia militias in that area?  And is there any filling of the vacuum of what al-Qaida leaves with the Shia militias, in places like Halas?

COL SUTHERLAND: Yeah, I would say that we’re having success against al-Qaida.  Shia militia activity has also reduced, and special groups continue to be targeted inside the provinces.  We conduct kinetic operations and clear an area, for instance, the Muqtadiyah area.  When we cleared Muqtadiyah, which as you know is about a hundred thousand people, we were very concerned about what was going to fill the vacuum left by al-Qaida.  And what filled it were concerned local citizens and tribal leaders participating and the Iraqi security force occupying the area, with an increase in police and CLC working together.  We have not seen any sort of special group or rogue militia coming in and filling that void.  But if we did, we would target them as well. 

RDML SMITH: And to answer your question on the forensics or the fingerprints back on special groups.  The most critical one of course is the self-confessions of detainees from the overnight raid.  So, one, we have confessions of their association as part of a special group.  We’re now looking into the actual network and how deep that goes.  But we do have the four individuals at least that were participants in that.  The other part of this is the type of weapon used and the materials used inside that weapon leave a fingerprint.  And that’s why we have the forensic intelligence capability that we briefed you on before that can help us identify whether it links itself back to previously known types of weapons and munitions used.  So in this instance, there are components of that particular bomb that we were able to identify and link back to, again, those being used previously by special groups and other militia groups, as opposed to al-Qaida as example. 

REP1:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                We have enough information in every conference which we try to cover.   As Iraqi journalists we are being abused.  And checkpoints are delaying us.  Checkpoint Three delays our entry, and they sometimes abuse us, use impolite words against us.  Do you know this?  Do you know about these violations?  Or you don’t know about them?

RDML SMITH: Well, I certainly appreciate you bringing it to my attention.  This forum that there are issues associated with your entry into the Green Zone.  I will personally talk to the commander associated with the checkpoints and advise them of your issues.  Particularly, if you could see me afterwards, I’d really be interested in knowing, perhaps today, what your particular issues were, and I will deal with them myself.

REP1:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                Another point, I just want to add something else.  We are the only Iraqi journalists…our channel is the only Iraqi conference who attended this conference.  My colleagues couldn’t enter, and they returned back because they didn’t enter the building.

RDML SMITH: Again, I apologize for any delays that you experienced or any other Iraqis experienced coming into the Green Zone.  As you know, this is a high security area.  Patience is, of course, the watchword with going through any security checkpoint.  However, any kind of inappropriate conduct by any personnel is unwarranted, and I’ll take personal steps to make certain that doesn’t happen in the future.  Shukran.

REP2:             Asking question in Arabic.

RDML SMITH: I apologize.  There was no translation.  Please.

INT:                He’s following up on the question of his colleague.  That when they were entering Checkpoint Three today, they were harassed and did not let them go through as any other western media came through today.  And he’s following up on the question.

REP2:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                As for my question, the Iranian attacks, do you think the Iranian government ordered these attacks, or are they individual actions by the special groups?

RDML SMITH: Again to be clear, and I appreciate you asking the question because I said earlier I have no evidence that the Iranian government ordered the attack or that the Iranian government was involved in the attack in any way, shape, or form.  What I did say were the individuals, Iraqis, who were members of the special group who have historical ties to Iran have been trained, funded, and equipped by the Quds force inside Iran – we’ve reported on that before – we assess as being responsible for yesterday’s attack. 

REP3:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                I have two questions.  First question, what is the ratio of the Iraqi forces to Multi-National forces in Diyala?  Second question, the withdrawal of the 3rd Brigade means that security has improved in Diyala.  Why don’t you transfer the security to the Iraqi forces?

COL SUTHERLAND: First off, the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi Army, has moved under the control of the Iraqi ground forces control in September.  And the Iraqi police, and the 5th Iraqi Army Division and the Iraqi police both fall under the Diyala Operations Command commanded by Staff Major General Abdul Kareem and his forces, which work for MOD.  So from that perspective, what we are conducting are partnered operations.  The orders and instructions are coming from the Iraqis in that perspective of the Iraqi security forces.  There are still enemy forces within Diyala.  There are still networks of al-Qaida functioning in Diyala, and we will continue to target those, working with 5th IA and assisting the Iraqi police to get stronger as they improve their capability.  Building capacity or capability is still one of our missions and our goals with the Iraqi security forces, along with the Department of Border Enforcement and the Port of Entry in Munthariyah.  What was the second question?

RDML SMITH: I think really you addressed it.  I think the issue was, as I understood it, you were suggesting that since security has improved to the degree it had, why not just turn everything over to the Iraqi security forces. I think Colonel Sutherland already pointed out that Diyala had been a sanctuary, a stronghold of al-Qaida.  And much of the security network, the government of Iraq’s security network inside Diyala, had been corrupted by that activity.  And so there was great deal of rebuilding and regeneration of capacity, especially in the police to be able to maintain security in Diyala.  And as the Colonel just pointed out, they have obviously begun to mature to where now the ground force commander has control of the Iraqi army in this case.  And as individuals that are volunteering for the Diyala police go through the training and take over those responsibilities, the transition of authority of responsibility to the Iraqi security forces is a natural evolution over time, but certainly not at this point in time.

REP4:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                My question is about the prison of Abu Ghraib.  I don’t want to talk about an issue in Diyala.  Are there any fugitives who run away from Abu Ghraib prison?  And according to my information, there were two people who run away, who escaped from Abu Ghraib prison, and these two people were involved in the explosion which took place in Turkey.  They belong to al-Qaida organization.

RDML SMITH: I have not heard that information.  That’s the first that somebody’s mentioned a connection between the Abu Ghraib prison and potential detainees that now have escaped and are connected in some way to what occurred in Turkey.  Is that what you’re saying?  I have not heard that, and I will certainly take that aboard and see if we can’t determine if that’s true or not.

REP4:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                Excuse me General.  Are there any people who escaped from Abu Ghraib prison?

RDML SMITH: Again, I’m not aware of that issue, but I’ll certainly look into it for you.  Other questions please.  Yes, ma’am.

REP5:             Sir, with regards to the overall improvements in security, is there any indication that al-Qaida might be shifting its operations to take advantage of the insecurity of Pakistan?  And as a result there are improvements here.  And I apologize if I’ve misunderstood, but over what period of time will we see the five thousand troop reduction?  When will that actually occur and start and end?  Thank you.

RDML SMITH: I think you’re first question had to deal with Pakistan and whether the instability in Pakistan is drawing some connection to what’s happening with al-Qaida here in Iraq.  The broader al-Qaida network, as you know, the leadership which resides largely in the northwest corner of Pakistan, has viewed Iraq as its main effort.  And that’s why we’ve said for a long time now that al-Qaida and its presence in Iraq is critical, I think, to al-Qaida’s broader network philosophy of creating a Taliban-like ideology across the greater Middle East.  And so why it’s so important for Iraqis to deal with Taliban here inside Iraq, which we again assess has been very successful.  Yet there’s still work to be done.  As to the period of time you’ll see the drawdown of the five thousand force, I think I’ll let the Colonel address that from a macro point of view and see if we can’t get you a good answer on that.

COL SUTHERLAND: My soldiers should all be redeployed by mid-December. 

REP6:             Sorry to keep coming back to this Colonel, but I think there’s some confusion.  Correct me if I’m wrong.  The 3rd Brigade Combat Team, a lot of those soldiers are actually in Baghdad, not just in Diyala.  Is that right, or no?

COL SUTHERLAND: No, sir.  All my soldiers are in Diyala province.  My brigade combat team has been fighting in Diyala province for the past fourteen months. 

REP6:             So there will be no decrease of surge troops in Baghdad itself?  Just these Diyala troops…

COL SUTHERLAND: Not as a result of this particular issue of the Wolf Brigade going back to the States, that’s correct.

REP6:             Right, but if you’re keeping the same number of boots on the ground in Diyala, that means some place else is being…is getting less boots.  So what place is that?  Is that some place else in the North, or Salahuddin, or…?  

COL SUTHERLAND: This would be obviously with the 4th Stryker Brigade.  And its areas of responsibility are now spreading from where it had been operating in to now to also absorb the activities up in the Diyala province, to answer your question.  Again, we’re not going to get into a lot of specific detail on force distribution for obvious reasons.  But I do just want to reassure from here that in Diyala, and that’s why we’re being as transparent as we possibly can on that, to make you aware of the fact that as the Wolf Brigade goes home, that forces here inside Iraq are taking over the responsibility.  And in fact, in this particular instance, the number of forces in Diyala will actually increase. 

REP7:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                As-Salāmu `Alaykum from the Iraqi Federation of Journalists.  Baghdad has witnessed a period of quietness.  These days, the car bombs returned and IEDs and the explosive vests, and Iraqi people are affected by these violent actions.   Is there any…what do you think is the reason behind this?  Is it the Multi-National Forces or the Iraqi army?  Another question…some politicians are following up the cases of the detainees like the Vice-President al-Hashimi, can the journalists, in general, take part in getting acquainted with the conditions of the detainees in Buqa and other detention camps of the Multi-National Forces?  You were talking about the security in Diyala.  What is the situation in the western side of Iraq?  I mean in Anbar.

RDML SMITH: I think I’m going to get a quick clarification.  There were three questions there.  The first one dealt with security in Baghdad, and how there’s been an increase in car bombing of late.  And your question dealt with who’s responsible or why we’re seeing that.  Second question had to deal with Buqa prison, and the third dealt with Diyala.  I think to your first point.  Again, we have been very clear that we did not see a future in the near-term in which the level of violence would be zero.  We knew that the enemy would attempt to regenerate and move into Baghdad in particular and conduct potentially horrific acts of violence like they did yesterday at the pet market.  Here you’ve got what we assess now to be militia extremist groups conducting those activities.  But you’ve seen al-Qaida as well.  We’ve been operating historically in the belt around Baghdad, having car bomb and other large vehicle-borne explosive device factories.  Those networks have been slowly eroded, but they are certainly not completely been erased.  And so we’ve got to be cautious about describing an environment in the coming weeks at least, in the coming months, in which Iraqis would be witnessing no acts of violence inside Baghdad.  It’s just not a practical, pragmatic response to what we see as the current threat.  You’re second, dealing with Buqa and other prisons.  Yes, I think there’s been a great deal of activity of late to make certain that the Iraqi people understand completely the reasons for the detention of Iraqis principally inside coalition force detention facilities.  They obviously are threats to Iraq’s security and will be retained inside those detention facilities until those independent review boards that are held between Iraqis and coalition forces consider the individual’s threat to have gone away.  And we’ve seen now some large release of detainees, and we’ll continue to see release of detainees averaging about fifty per day.  Yes, ma’am, I think you’ve got another point to your question. 

REP7:             Asking question in Arabic.

INT:                For the second time I repeat my question.  Can the journalists, the Iraqi journalists in particular, can they follow up and get themselves acquainted with the conditions of these prisoners?  Can they?

RDML SMITH: There actually was at least on two occasions in the last month or so opportunities being provided by the head of detainee affairs, Task Force 134, to invite journalists to come and get briefings on the conduct of our detention operations.  We do not provide unlimited access to detention facilities.  And access to detainees is very limited.  But the overall conduct of our operations should be something that we would definitely want you to be exposed to.  So if you’ve got an interest in that, please leave me your card afterwards.  I’ll make certain the people in charge of that contact you the next time we do a visit.

RUBIN:          I just had a question about the pet market bombing.  This seems to be very different for a special group to do.  Typically we see them do targeted assassinations and attacks against coalition forces, but I’ve never heard of them doing market bombings before.  That’s usually al-Qaida.  So what has changed?

RDML SMITH: Again, I think in my comments we assess that it appears that the intent here was to suggest that al-Qaida had conducted this operation.  And through that kind of intimidation, suggest that the people, at least in that area, that what they really need to protect them from this kind of violence is these militia groups, that the militia groups are the groups that they should depend upon for their personal security as opposed to Iraqi security forces.  I think that’s their intent by doing this.  I’ll grant you it’s a very twisted intent to try to achieve with the lives of innocent civilians.  But we assess that to be their main motivation.  And I think one more question.  Yes, sir.

REP9:             Just a quick follow up, Colonel Sutherland.  With 3,000 volunteers for Iraqi police in Diyala, would you call that good?  How would you describe that?  And if you could also elaborate the 2-to-1 Sunni and Shia.  What does that tell you?  And how do you keep these volunteers coming in the future?

COL SUTHERLAND: First off, I think that the people participating in the security process and the political process in any capacity in Diyala is very good, because it shows a great deal of confidence in their efforts, even though they’re being targeted by al-Qaida and other militia or extremist organizations.  As far as what the hiring practices of the provincial director of police tells me is that we have taken a great step forward in the PDOP, hiring people that are representative of the neighborhoods in Diyala, as opposed to when we first got here and the previous provincial director of police would only hire from Baghdad.  He is now—General Ghanam—is now hiring from the neighborhoods so the people know and want to protect their own families, friends, and those they live with.  So I think it’s a very good step.  And it shows an equitable hiring practice within the province. 

REP9:             Is there a number that you’re looking for?  You have 3,000 now, what are you looking for?

COL SUTHERLAND: Well he has been given an increase in authorization of six thousand, General Ghanam has by the MOI.  He has been authorized to hire those by the MOI as opposed to any one outside organization doing the hiring.  And so that’s what we’re looking for, six thousand more.  And again, those that meet the criteria laid out by MOI, those that have the background checks are vetted, and are the ones that he’s hiring, those without records, etc.

RDML SMITH: Well, thank you for coming out.  Tomorrow we’ll host another press event with Brigadier General Yarbrough, who’s with the Iraqi Assistance Group, along with General Moshon, and the focus of tomorrow’s briefing will be on Iraqi border control.  That should be a good briefing.  Wednesday General Odierno and General Abud are scheduled to be here in the studio for an operational update that I’m sure you’ll all be interested in attending as well.  And we’d like to have a couple other events also during the week.  So please keep in touch.  Thank you very much.